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I. Introduction
When fifteen-year-old Alyssa Beck ran away from home,
her life changed forever.1 Fleeing an abusive father, Alyssa
moved in with friends.2 One friend introduced her to a few older
men who took her under their wings.3 They let Alyssa stay in
their apartments and began buying her food, clothes, hair
products, and makeup.4
“I thought these guys were my boyfriends,” Alyssa said.5
“Everything that was missing in my life they supplied to me.”6
One of these men was Ian Sean Gordon.7 Gordon was the
first to rape Alyssa.8 He shoved a pillow over her face and called
his friends, telling them they could “do whatever [they] want to

1. See Michelle Miller, Inside the World of Child Sex Trafficking and the
High-Tech Approach to Saving Victims, CBS (Mar. 31, 2018), https://perma.cc
/4XZH-NV9E (last visited Jan. 23, 2020) (describing how Alyssa became
involved with a sex trafficker) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
2. See id. (explaining that the first time Alyssa ran away was after her
father hit her with a belt and a subsequent Social Services investigation failed
to discover any abuse).
3. See id. (stating that the men allowed Alyssa to sleep in their
apartments, bought her clothes, and provided her food as part of their
“grooming” scheme).
4. See id. (“They gave me the clothes that I needed, the hair stuff, the
makeup and they made me feel pretty.”).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See id. (stating that Alyssa met Gordon after two weeks of living on
the streets).
8. See id. (explaining that a few days after meeting Alyssa, Gordon
became violent and brutally beat and raped her).
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her” for twenty dollars.9 After the rape, Gordon threatened to
kill Alyssa and her family if she tried to leave.10
As the days progressed, Gordon drove Alyssa to various
hotels where he supplied an endless stream of customers who
paid him to rape Alyssa.11 Gordon got her addicted to drugs and
took all of her clothes to prevent her from running away from
the hotels.12
Alyssa almost gave up, until one person gave her the
strength to attempt an escape.13 “I remember one time I was
there and it was after a really bad beating and rape,” Alyssa
said.14 “I remember sitting there and thinking about my little
brother. And I just remember thinking about my brother’s
smile. And just thinking about his innocence.”15
The thoughts of her younger brother inspired Alyssa to run
out of a motel room one day while Gordon was not looking.16 But
within seconds, Gordon was behind her, grabbing her and
dragging her to his car.17 “You’re gonna die today,” Gordon said
as he threw Alyssa into the car.18 Alyssa did not allow fear to
paralyze her—when the car came to a stoplight, she jumped
out.19 Beaten and bloody, she ran down the expressway until she

9. See id. (“I heard him start call[ing] to people and telling them, ‘Hey,
I have this girl here, you can come do whatever you want to her, just for 20
dollars.’”).
10. See id. (explaining that it is common for sex traffickers to use violence
and threats to compel their victims to act in a certain way).
11. See id. (discussing Alyssa’s memories of being raped by dozens of
men).
12. See id. (“They know that pain and the addiction can force their victims
into providing more services in order to get their fix.”).
13. See id. (“But in her darkest days, there was one person who kept her
going.”).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See id. (stating that after two weeks of being held in captivity, Alyssa
summoned the courage to attempt an escape).
17. See id. (“Next thing you know this thing comes behind me and grabs
me by my hair and this thing was [Gordon].”).
18. Id.
19. See id. (stating that Alyssa attempted one last escape).
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found a phone and called her mother.20 Her mother called
police.21
The FBI eventually took on Alyssa’s case, which led to the
arrests of seven people involved in buying or trafficking
Alyssa.22 Gordon pleaded guilty to sex trafficking and was
sentenced to life in prison23—one of the first life sentences
handed down to a trafficker in the United States.24
Alyssa’s story, though utterly horrific, is far from unique.25
Around the globe, an estimated 40.3 million victims share
similar realities to Alyssa’s.26 Modern-day slavery, commonly
referred to as human trafficking,27 continues to be the
fastest-growing and most lucrative global industry—ahead of
the drug industry—because a human can be used, abused, sold,
and exploited time and time again, unlike drugs that disappear
once consumed.28 State-sanctioned slavery was abolished in

20. See id. (explaining that Alyssa passed out and then made her way to
a Regency Inn to call her mother).
21. See id. (stating that Alyssa’s mom called the police before picking
Alyssa up).
22. See id. (stating that the FBI’s “Operation Abandoned Hope” led to the
arrests of seven people by the summer of 2010).
23. See id. (stating that Gordon and five others pleaded guilty to sex
trafficking and another man pleaded guilty to producing child pornography for
his part in filming Alyssa).
24. See id. (stating that the federal judge imposed a life sentence due to
“the brutality and violence and complete and utter lack of respect for human
life”).
25. See U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, GLOBAL REPORT ON
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 6 (2009) (stating that sexual exploitation makes up
seventy-nine percent of human trafficking instances, making it the most
common form of trafficking).
26. See Forced Labour, Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking, ILO,
https://perma.cc/LCR6-39EX (last visited Jan 26, 2020) (“At any given time in
2016, an estimated 40.3 million people are in modern slavery . . . .”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
27. See What Is Modern Slavery, U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE, https://perma.cc
/S5A8-PQ32 (last visited Jan. 26, 2020) (“‘Trafficking in persons,’ ‘human
trafficking,’ and ‘modern slavery’ are used as umbrella terms to refer to both
sex trafficking and forced labor.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
28. See ANNA RODRIGUEZ, MA’AM ANNA: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF A
HUMAN TRAFFICKING RESCUER 31 (Amanda Bindel ed., 2013) (comparing the
human trafficking industry to the drug industry).
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1865,29 but the practice has only expanded since then.30 Today,
human trafficking is a $150 billion industry.31 If lined up
shoulder to shoulder, slaves in today’s world would create a line
from Beijing, China to Cape Town, South Africa.32 Of the victims
currently enslaved, twenty-five percent are children.33 In other
words, one in four victims of modern slavery is a child.34
In 2000, Congress passed the Victims of Trafficking and
Violence Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1591, to protect children
like Alyssa.35 It criminalized defendants who knowingly
engaged in a trafficking act, knew the victim was underage, and
knew that the child victim would be forced to engage in a
commercial sex act.36 In 2008, Congress amended the statute in
order to relax the government’s burden of proof by reducing the
mens rea element requiring knowledge that the victim was a

29. See Slavery Abolished in America with Adoption of 13th Amendment,
HISTORY.COM (July 21, 2010), https://perma.cc/9MZG-LWQU (last visited Jan.
26, 2020) (noting that the Thirteenth Amendment was officially adopted into
the Constitution in 1865) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
30. See
Tedx
Talks, Every
15
Seconds:
Matt
Friedman
TEDxSanJoaquin, YOUTUBE (Nov. 8, 2012), https://youtu.be/iU9TeVofkDo
(noting that the number of slaves has nearly tripled since the end of the
Transatlantic slave trade).
31. See ILO Says Forced Labour Generates Annual Profits of US $150
Billion, ILO (May 20, 2014), https://perma.cc/E4GH-W86Q (last visited Jan.
26, 2020) (stating that every year, forced labor generates $150 billion in illegal
profits, two-thirds of which is produced from commercial sexual exploitation)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
32. See Tedx Talks, supra note 30 (“If you were to line these people up
shoulder to shoulder, it would take you all the way from Beijing, China to Cape
Town, South Africa.”).
33. See Forced Labour, Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking, supra
note 26 (“1 in 4 victims of modern slavery are children.”).
34. Id.
35. See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub.
L. No. 106-386, § 112, 114 Stat. 1464 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1591) [hereinafter
TVPA of 2000] (enacting the child sex trafficking statute to strengthen
“prosecution and punishment of traffickers”).
36. See John Cotton Richmond, Federal Human Trafficking Review: An
Analysis & Recommendations from the 2016 Legal Developments, 52 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 293, 302 (2017) (explaining Congress’s original wording and
intent for the statute).
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minor.37 Under the amendment, a conviction now requires that
a defendant either knew the victim’s age, recklessly disregarded
the victim’s age, or had a “reasonable opportunity to observe”
the victim.38
Subsection (c) of the statute states: “In a prosecution under
subsection (a)(1) in which the defendant had a reasonable
opportunity to observe the person so recruited, enticed,
harbored, transported, provided, obtained or maintained, the
Government need not prove that the defendant knew that the
person had not attained the age of 18 years.”39 This provision
caused confusion among scholars40 and district courts41
37. See
William
Wilberforce
Trafficking
Victims
Protection
Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, § 222, 122 Stat. 5044
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1591) [hereinafter Victims Protection Reauthorization
Act] (providing that the Government need not show that a defendant knew the
victim had not attained the age of eighteen to prove a “reasonable opportunity
to observe”); see also United States v. Duong, 848 F.3d 928, 933–34 (10th Cir.
2017) (“Section 1591(c) specifically states that the government should be
relieved of a burden when a defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe
the victim.”).
38. Compare TVPA of 2000 § 112 (requiring a person to knowingly engage
in a trafficking act, know that a victim was underage, and know that the child
victim would be compelled to engage in a commercial sex act), with Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act § 222 (amending the statute to include a
“reckless disregard” and “reasonable opportunity to observe” standard).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c) (2018) (emphasis added).
40. See Richmond, supra note 36, at 303 (“At the time these amendments
were passed, it was unclear how courts might apply the . . . ‘reasonable
opportunity to observe’ provision.”); see also Tiffanie N. Choate, Comment,
Protecting the Lydias, Linas, and Tinas from Sex Trafficking: A Call to
Eliminate Ambiguities of 18 U.S.C. § 1591, 65 OKLA. L. REV. 665, 689 (2013)
The court must also consider whether to instruct the jury to focus
on either the reasonableness of the opportunity to observe the
minor or the reasonableness of the conclusions drawn from the
opportunity to observe the minor . . . . Neither case law nor
legislative history provides any concrete guidance as to the
appropriate definition of “reasonable opportunity to observe.”
41. Compare United States v. Wilson, No. 10-60101-CR-ZLOCH
/ROSENBAUM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75149, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Jul. 27, 2010)
(“[W]here the Government elects to proceed under the reckless disregard level
of mens rea, Section 1591(c) requires the Government to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt not only that the defendant acted in reckless disregard, but
also that the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe the person
recruited.”), with United States v. Rivera, No. 13-CR-149(KAM), 2015 WL
7455504, at *21 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 2015) (“[T]he government may satisfy its
burden for the mens rea element in one of three ways, by proving that the
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regarding the standard of proof necessary to show a “reasonable
opportunity to observe” a victim. Some courts held that the
provision required a showing of both a reckless disregard of the
victim’s age and a “reasonable opportunity to observe” the
victim.42 Others found it required either a showing of a reckless
disregard or a “reasonable opportunity to observe” the victim.43
Under the latter interpretation, any defense regarding lack of
knowledge of a victim’s age would thus be irrelevant to a
prosecution under the “reasonable opportunity to observe”
provision.44 This interpretation requiring strict liability
eventually became the settled standard once cases reached
federal appellate courts.45 In other words, a “reasonable

defendant (1) had knowledge of the victim’s age; (2) acted in reckless disregard
of the victim’s age; or (3) had a reasonable opportunity to view the victim.”).
42. See Wilson, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75149, at *7 (stating that the
Government must prove a defendant’s reckless disregard of the victim’s age as
well as his “reasonable opportunity to observe” the victim); see also United
States v. Robinson, 702 F.3d 22, 31 (2d Cir. 2012) (Kearse, J., concurring)
I am not persuaded that the amended section imposes strict liability
on a defendant who has a reasonable opportunity to observe his
underage sex-trafficking victim but who neither knows nor
recklessly disregards the fact that the victim has not attained the
age of 18 years . . . . It is not clear to me that when Congress, in the
amended § 1591, specified only that such an opportunity to observe
means that the government need not prove that the defendant
“knew,” 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c), Congress meant that the government
also need not prove that the defendant acted in reckless disregard.
43. See Rivera, 2015 WL 7455504, at *21 (stating that a conviction is
proper upon a showing of a defendant’s reckless disregard of a victim’s age or
upon a showing of his “reasonable opportunity to observe” the victim).
44. See id. (stating that strict liability applies to the “reasonable
opportunity to observe” provision).
45. See United States v. Lockhart, 844 F.3d 501, 515–16 (5th Cir. 2016)
(stating that the language in § 1591(c) transformed the offense “from one
requiring a specific mens rea into a strict liability offense”); United States v.
Smith, 662 F. App’x 132, 136 (3d Cir. 2016) (stating that this provision
“imposes strict liability with regard to the defendant’s awareness of the
victim’s age, thus relieving the government’s usual burden to prove knowledge
or reckless disregard of the victim’s underage status . . . .” (quoting United
States v. Robinson, 702 F.3d 22, 26 (2d Cir. 2012))); United States v. Davis,
854 F.3d 601, 605 (9th Cir. 2017) (stating that § 1591(c) created a strict
liability offense); United States v. Booker, 447 F. App’x 726, 727 (7th Cir. 2011)
(noting that “lack of knowledge of the minor’s age is not a defense if the
defendant had a ‘reasonable opportunity to observe’ the victim.” (citing 18
U.S.C. § 1591(c))).
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opportunity to observe” is a standalone mens rea element and
the statute requires a showing of either a “reasonable
opportunity to observe” or a “reckless disregard,” but not both.46
The appellate clarification of the correct strict liability
statutory standard caused a new wave of confusion regarding
what behavior constitutes a “reasonable opportunity to
observe.”47 Director of the Human Trafficking Institute John
Cotton Richmond opined that recent Second and Fifth Circuit
cases applying the statue have highlighted an emerging
question: “What evidence does it take to prove that a defendant
had a ‘reasonable opportunity to observe’ his victim?”48
Richmond predicts that this evidentiary threshold is likely to
become a frequent topic of litigation, and thus, “[g]uidance will
be necessary as future courts determine what contact or
information is sufficient to apply the ‘reasonable opportunity to
observe’ standard.”49
This Note addresses how courts should interpret the
“reasonable opportunity to observe” standard when assessing
evidence. In other words, what quantum of evidence is, and
should be, sufficient to prove a defendant had a “reasonable
opportunity to observe” a sex trafficking victim? Would a
singular brief encounter with an older-appearing prostitute
satisfy the standard? If so, would the mere fact that the
“prostitute” was actually a minor be the only evidence needed to
obtain a conviction? Or would the defendant’s intention and
attempt to order services from an adult prostitute shed light on
the reasonableness of his observation opportunity? Moreover, in

46. See Robinson, 702 F.3d at 30 (describing the jury instructions that
required the government to prove the defendant “knew that Jane Doe had not
attained the age of eighteen years, or he recklessly disregarded that fact, or
he had a reasonable opportunity to observe Jane Doe”); United States v.
Copeland, 820 F.3d 809, 812 (5th Cir. 2016) (upholding jury instructions that
required proof that “(1) the defendant knew T.J. had not attainted the age of
18 years, or (2) the defendant recklessly disregarded the fact that T.J. had not
attained the age of 18 years, or (3) the defendant had a reasonable opportunity
to observe T.J.”).
47. See Richmond, supra note 36, at 308, 357 (stating that the Fifth
Circuit’s 2016 cases highlighted “an emerging question” of the evidentiary
standard necessary to prove a “reasonable opportunity to observe,” which “teed
up future litigation over the quantum of evidence sufficient to trigger its
application”).
48. Id. at 308.
49. Id. at 309.
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the age of increasing technology, would trafficking a minor
through a webcam videochat satisfy the standard? For instance,
would a man in the United States requesting sexual
performances from a Filipino child over videochat constitute a
“reasonable opportunity to observe” that child even without an
in-person, face-to-face interaction? This Note answers these
questions.
Part II analyzes three recent cases that employ the
“reasonable opportunity to observe” standard: United States v.
Robinson,50 United States v. Copeland,51 and United States v.
Valas.52 It then determines which factors these cases reveal as
sufficient to constitute a “reasonable opportunity to observe.”
Part III discusses how the currently utilized factors and
interpretation of the standard create two issues:
under-criminalization of legitimate forms of sex trafficking and
over-criminalization of non-trafficking behavior. Part IV
articulates a solution by presenting a revised list of factors that
courts should consider when determining whether a defendant
had a “reasonable opportunity to observe” a victim. For purposes
of this Note, traffickers are referred to in masculine pronouns
and victims are referred to in feminine pronouns. However, this
Note recognizes that women can be, and are, perpetrators of
trafficking, while men and boys can be victims of sex
trafficking.53
II. What Is a “Reasonable Opportunity to Observe?”
Three cases in the past six years “teed up future litigation
over the quantum of evidence sufficient to trigger” a “reasonable

50.
51.
52.
53.

702 F.3d 22 (2d Cir. 2012).
820 F.3d 809 (5th Cir. 2016).
822 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 2016).
See UNODC, Global Report on Trafficking in Persons, UNITED
NATIONS (2014), https://perma.cc/PS2X-3R4M (PDF) (stating that over thirty
percent of convicted traffickers between 2010 and 2012 were women) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Michelle Lillie, Invisible
Men: Male Victims of Sex Trafficking, HUMAN TRAFFICKING SEARCH (2014),
https://perma.cc/PCF7-FK5K (last visited Jan. 31, 2020) (stating that while
women comprise the majority of detected sex trafficking victims, men are the
most overlooked victims of sex trafficking) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
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opportunity to observe” conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c).54
In 2012, the Second Circuit affirmed a child sex trafficking
conviction in United States v. Robinson, in which the defendant
sold his apparently consenting seventeen-year-old girlfriend to
multiple customers for commercial sex.55 The teen dropped out
of high school and became an exotic dancer and prostitute.56 She
testified that she routinely told her clients and friends,
including the defendant, that she was nineteen.57 She insisted
that the defendant was her boyfriend, rather than her pimp, and
that he did not facilitate her line of work.58 Nevertheless, in a
special verdict form, the jury explicitly found that the defendant
had a “reasonable opportunity to observe” the victim and the
Second Circuit affirmed the verdict.59
In 2016, the Fifth Circuit also affirmed a child sex
trafficking conviction in United States v. Copeland which
involved two men engaged in a traditional pimping scheme.60
The victim, T.J., had run away from her home in San Antonio,
Texas.61 While at a bus stop, she met Marcus Wright—Malcolm
Copeland’s codefendant—who recruited and convinced her to
prostitute.62 The victim told Wright that she was fifteen and he
advised her to tell everyone that she was eighteen.63 It is not
clear whether Wright informed his partner Copeland of the
victim’s true age.64 Copeland later posted photographs of T.J. on
54. Richmond, supra note 36, at 308, 357.
55. See Robinson, 702 F.3d at 35 (“[H]e was causing her to engage in
commercial sex acts as a minor.”).
56. See id. at 27 (explaining that Jane Doe was arrested several times for
prostitution after dropping out of high school).
57. See id. (explaining Jane Doe’s testimony that she told “everybody”
that she was nineteen).
58. See id. (stating that Jane Doe claimed that the defendant lived off her
prostitution income but that he in no way facilitated her line of work).
59. See id. at 29 (providing that the jury returned a special verdict finding
that Robinson had a “reasonable opportunity to observe” Jane Doe).
60. See Copeland, 820 F.3d at 811 (stating that Copeland and his
codefendant ran an escort service).
61. See id. at 810 (stating that T.J. was a runaway).
62. See id. (describing how Wright advised the victim to lie about her
name and age and introduced her to the codefendants, one of whom explained
that she would be having sex with different men for money).
63. See id. (“Wright told her to tell everyone that she was eighteen and
that her name was Barbie.”).
64. See id. (stating only that the victim revealed her age to Wright).
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Backpage.com65—an advertising website since shut down by the
government due to its promotion of sex trafficking.66 Wright
gave T.J. a cellphone through which customers contacted her.67
He or Copeland then transported her to meet customers.68 In
response to a possible missing person report, police officers were
dispatched to a motel where they found T.J.69 Copeland was
convicted of sex trafficking children under 18 U.S.C. § 159170
and the Fifth Circuit upheld his conviction, rejecting his
argument that the statute does not impose strict liability and
the judge should not have instructed the jury to convict upon a
finding of a “reasonable opportunity to observe” the victim
alone.71
Finally, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction of
Raymond R. Valas in 2016.72 Valas, a former Army Lieutenant
Colonel, contacted T.J., the victim from Copeland, through a
Backpage.com advertisement.73 He admitted that he met the
victim at his hotel room on two different nights,74 but claimed

65. See id. (stating that the codefendants advertised the prostitutes on
Backpage.com).
66. See Taylor Goebel, Human Trafficking ‘Hub’ Backpage Is Long Gone,
but the Problem Still Remains, USA TODAY (Feb. 7, 2019), https://perma.cc
/5FRW-BH7T (last visited Jan. 26, 2020) (explaining that the website was
involved in three-quarters of child trafficking reports received by the National
Center for Missing and Exploited Children between 2013 and 2017) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
67. See United States v. Copeland, 820 F.3d 809, 811 (5th Cir. 2016) (“T.J.
received calls from potential clients on a cell phone provided by Wright.”).
68. See id. (“Some combination of Copeland, Wright and Doak would
transport T.J. to the prearranged location of her sexual assaults.”).
69. See id. at 810 (explaining that police officers found T.J. in a Motel 6
room in San Antonio, Texas).
70. See id. at 811 (providing that the jury convicted Copeland of two
counts of sex trafficking and the court sentenced him to 216 months in prison
and twenty years of supervised release).
71. See id. (rejecting Copeland’s arguments that 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c) does
not impose strict liability and is an unconstitutional provision).
72. See United States v. Valas, 822 F.3d 228, 248 (5th Cir. 2016)
(rejecting Valas’s argument regarding the statute’s requisite mens rea and
affirming his conviction).
73. See id. at 235 (describing the victim’s testimony that she received
online messages from Valas about meeting him at a hotel).
74. See id. (“Valas admitted to the jury that he met with T.J. at his hotel
room briefly on two different nights . . . .”).
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he was interviewing her as part of his research fellowship at
Syracuse University, in which he was studying Salvadoran gang
activity and sex trafficking.75 He maintained that he and T.J.
first interacted during a thirty-second conversation at his hotel
door76 and then spoke for fifteen minutes the following day.77
Through his own volition, he sought and passed a
privately-administered polygraph test in which he repeatedly
denied having sex with T.J.78 The judge found the test legally
unreliable and it was not introduced into evidence.79 T.J. denied
participating in any research interview and testified that Valas
paid her $150 on both nights to engage in commercial sex.80
Phone records showed that Valas and T.J. spoke on the phone
eighteen times and texted four times before the second
interaction the following day.81 Valas based his appeal on seven
arguments, one of which maintained that the statute does not
allow a conviction based solely on a “reasonable opportunity to
observe” the victim.82 The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument
and affirmed his conviction.83

75. See Jeremy Blackman, National Guard Commander Disputes Texas
Sex Trafficking Claim, CONCORD MONITOR (Nov. 7, 2014 1:39:08 AM), https://
perma.cc/7FHR-NL3G (last visited Jan. 22, 2019) (discussing Valas’s
enrollment in a research fellowship) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); see also Valas, 822 F.3d at 242 (stating that Valas testified that he
called T.J. as part of his independent and unofficial scholarly research on
prostitution).
76. See Valas, 822 F.3d at 235 (explaining Valas’s testimony that he met
the victim at the hotel room door for less than thirty seconds on August 26,
2013).
77. See id. (explaining Valas’s testimony that he spoke with the victim on
August 27, 2013 for no more than fifteen minutes as part of his independent
research project).
78. See Blackman, supra note 75 (“Valas later passed a polygraph test in
which he was repeatedly asked whether he had sex with the girl . . . .”).
79. See id. (“[T]he test was unsolicited and therefore legally unreliable.”).
80. See Valas, 822 F.3d at 235 (explaining testimony that Valas gave the
victim $150 each day, which was her price for thirty minutes of sexual
services).
81. See id. (discussing the multiple phone calls and text messages
between Valas and the victim that occurred over the course of two days).
82. See id. (describing Valas’s argument that “the district court
improperly instructed the jury on § 1591’s scienter requirement regarding the
victim’s age, resulting in a conviction based on a lower mental state than
authorized by the statute”).
83. See id. (affirming Valas’s conviction).
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Though the cases of Robinson, Copeland, and Valas
involved vastly different facts, the courts relied upon
surprisingly similar factors in affirming each conviction, as this
section will demonstrate.
A. Recent Trends: Robinson, Copeland, and Valas
Each court highlighted several factors that were relevant to
the question of whether the evidence showed a “reasonable
opportunity to observe” a child sex trafficking victim.84 In
affirming Robinson’s conviction, the Second Circuit did not
explicitly state the requisite evidence to prove the standard, but
it noted several relevant factors.85 It repeatedly discussed the
victim’s youthful appearance and demeanor,86 despite holding
that the standard required strict liability and thus that the
defendant need not be aware of the victim’s age.87 It stated that
because the victim appeared youthful, “her status as a minor
would have been obvious” to any observer,88 implying that the
reasonableness of the defendant’s observation opportunity
depends in part on whether the victim’s demeanor and
appearance match her true age. The court also emphasized the
84. See id. at 240–41 (discussing the defendant’s knowledge of the signs
of human trafficking, prior involvement in prostitution schemes, and other
factors); see also United States v. Copeland, 820 F.3d 809, 810–11 (5th Cir.
2016) (discussing the recruitment of the victim, transportation of victim,
knowledge of victim’s age, and other factors); United States v. Robinson, 702
F.3d 22, 27–28, 36 (2d Cir. 2012) (discussing the underage social network of
the victim, the defendant’s access to the victim’s finances, the defendant’s
history of prostitution involvement, and other factors).
85. See Robinson, 702 F.3d at 35–36 (explaining the court’s rejection of
the defendant’s evidentiary challenges regarding the “reasonable opportunity
to observe” provision).
86. See id. at 35
[T]he jury had an opportunity to observe Jane Doe testify at trial,
when she was nineteen years old, and also to view several
photographs of Jane Doe taken before she turned eighteen . . . [and]
that Jane Doe’s appearance and demeanor were such that her
status as a minor would have been obvious to someone intimately
involved in her life.
87. See id. at 26 (“This provision, when applicable, imposes strict liability
with regard to the defendant’s awareness of the victim’s age, thus relieving
the government’s usual burden to prove knowledge or reckless disregard of the
victim’s underage status under § 1591(a).”).
88. Id. at 35.
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significance of the underage social network of the victim and
noted that because Robinson met the victim through his high
school-aged sister, he was likely aware of the victim’s age.89
Additionally, the court discussed as relevant factors the
length of the two-and-a-half-year relationship between
Robinson and the victim,90 as well as the intimate nature of the
relationship.91 Moreover, it noted Robinson’s coercive behavior,
as the evidence showed that he regularly used the victim’s sex
work profits for himself92 and repeatedly threatened and
pressured her into prostituting on certain nights.93 Finally, the
court highlighted Robinson’s history of pimping,94 which could
make him more knowledgeable of the signs of human trafficking
and therefore require a shorter period of time necessary to
constitute a “reasonable opportunity to observe.”95
Like the Second Circuit, the Fifth Circuit implied certain
relevant factors of a “reasonable opportunity to observe” in
United States v. Copeland.96 It discussed the fact that Copeland
89. See id. at 36 (stating that a reasonable jury could find that Robinson
was aware of the victim’s age, and thus had a “reasonable opportunity to
observe” the victim, “especially given that their relationship began before Jane
Doe dropped out of high school during her junior year”).
90. See id. at 35 (quoting the government’s position that “it would strain
credulity to suggest that someone who had known her as long and as
intimately as Robinson would not have learned her true age”).
91. See id. at 35–36 (“A reasonable jury could conclude that Robinson’s
ability to personally observe his underage victim, especially given their
intimate relationship, put him on notice of an unjustifiably high risk that she
was underage.”).
92. See id. at 28 (discussing a tape in which Robinson admitted to using
the victim’s profits).
93. See id. at 38
A reasonable juror, for example, could conclude that Robinson
sounded a lot more like Jane Doe’s pimp than her “boyfriend,”
“lover,” or “best friend,” when he threatened that, if she did not have
the “f***ing money,” he would “beat the sh**’ out of [her] stupid
a** . . . [and] throw [her] in a f***ing garbage can and let everybody
know [she] ain’t sh**.”
94. See id. at 28 (explaining a tape played at trial that portrayed
Robinson’s involvement and promotion of prostitution in the past).
95. Compare id. (describing Robinson’s admission of his history with
pimping), with United States v. Valas, 822 F.3d 228, 241 (5th Cir. 2016)
(concluding that Valas’s annual employment training about human trafficking
made it more likely that he was aware of the “signs, dangers, and horrors” of
trafficking).
96. 820 F.3d 809 (5th Cir. 2016).
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was part of an operation that actively recruited the victim for
prostitution,97 took photographs of her,98 and used
Backpage.com to advertise her for commercial sex.99 The most
important factor seemed to be that Copeland physically
interacted with the victim when he transported her to meet
sex-buyers.100 Moreover, like the Robinson court, the Copeland
court implied that knowledge of the victim’s age could create a
“reasonable opportunity” by noting that the victim told the
codefendant that she was fifteen, and thus, Copeland might
have been aware of her age.101 Though the statute forbids lack
of knowledge of a victim’s age as a defense,102 a victim revealing
her age to a defendant would certainly increase the
reasonableness of any opportunity to observe her.
Additionally, similar to the Second Circuit, the Fifth Circuit
emphasized Copeland’s multiple interactions with sex
trafficking victims, as he had been indicted for trafficking
another minor.103 His other experiences could have made him
more aware of the signs of human trafficking, which would
shorten the period of time necessary for him to have a
“reasonable opportunity to observe” a trafficking victim.104
Finally, the court noted the length and coercive nature of the
interaction and observation opportunity by explaining that for
five days, Copeland ordered the victim to perform sexual acts
97. See id. at 810 (noting that Copeland assisted his codefendants with
recruiting and training potential prostitutes).
98. See id. (“Copeland . . . had [the codefendant] take pictures of T.J. for
her internet profile.”).
99. See id. (stating that Copeland and his codefendants posted pictures
of the prostitutes to Backpage.com).
100. See id. at 811 (noting that Copeland transported the victim to various
hotels and directed her to perform sexual acts for money).
101. Compare United States v. Robinson, 702 F.3d 22, 35–36 (2d Cir. 2012)
(“Jane Doe’s appearance and demeanor were such that her status as a minor
would have been obvious. . . .”), with Copeland, 820 F.3d at 810 (stating that
the victim told Copeland’s codefendant that she was fifteen years old).
102. See Copeland, 820 F.3d at 813 (providing that the statute imposes
strict liability).
103. Compare id. at 811 (explaining that Copeland’s indictment referenced
T.J. and another minor victim), with Robinson, 702 F.3d at 28 (describing
Robinson’s promotion of prostitution in prior instances).
104. Compare Copeland, 820 F.3d at 810 (describing Copeland’s prior
involvement with recruiting and training prostitutes), with Valas, 822 F.3d at
241 (“He was trained on human trafficking: its signs, dangers, and horrors.”).
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for money and transported her to the “prearranged location[s] of
her sexual assaults.”105
The Fifth Circuit relied on similar factors in United States
v. Valas.106 Like the other two courts, the Valas court
emphasized the defendant’s prior involvement with human
trafficking107—but this time in a very different way. Unlike
Robinson and Copeland, whose experiences as pimps exposed
them to human trafficking victims,108 Valas’s prior involvement
with trafficking consisted only of general knowledge of the
industry.109 The court stated that Valas had attended training
sessions at his place of employment that centered on recognizing
signs of human trafficking and, thus, he knew “its signs,
dangers, and horrors.”110 Moreover, Valas, like Robinson111 and
Copeland,112 had prior experience with the adult prostitution
industry.113 He had previously interacted with and possibly had
sex with other prostitutes whom he contacted on
Backpage.com.114 Finally, the Valas court noted the defendant’s

105. See Copeland, 820 F.3d at 811 (“For five days in 2013, T.J. was
directed by Copeland . . . to perform sexual acts for money.”).
106. 822 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 2016).
107. See id. at 241 (describing the training Valas attended).
108. See Robinson, 702 F.3d at 28 (noting Robinson’s prior experience as a
pimp); see also United States v. Copeland, 820 F.3d 809, 810 (5th Cir. 2016)
(stating that Copeland was part of an operation that recruited multiple
prostitutes).
109. See Valas, 822 F.3d at 241 (stating that the defendant participated in
annual Department of Defense training on human trafficking).
110. See id. (concluding that the PowerPoint slides cast doubt on Valas’s
defense because “he was trained on human trafficking: its signs, dangers, and
horrors”).
111. See United States v. Robinson, 702 F.3d 22, 28 (2d Cir. 2012)
(describing Robinson’s history of pimping).
112. See Copeland, 820 F.3d at 810 (stating that Copeland recruited and
trained other prostitutes).
113. See Valas, 822 F.3d at 240 (describing evidence of messages between
Valas and six other prostitutes on Backpage.com).
114. See id. (discussing evidence that Valas had contacted at least six
other women on Backpage.com both before and after he met T.J.).
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interaction with the victim for between fifteen and sixty
minutes115 and the sexual nature of their encounter.116
An analysis of these three cases reveals that the Second and
Fifth Circuits utilize similar factors to determine whether a
defendant had a “reasonable opportunity to observe” a child sex
trafficking victim. The following subsection lists the combined
criteria these courts have relied on in their analyses of the
requisite evidence to obtain a § 1591(c) conviction. This
predictive list sheds light on how the Second and Fifth Circuits,
and potentially other Circuits and lower courts, approach §
1591(c) cases.
B. The Current Interpretation: Necessary Factors to Constitute
a “Reasonable Opportunity to Observe”
The Robinson, Copeland, and Valas courts focused on
defendants engaged in starkly different behaviors. Robinson’s
trafficking act involved his three-year romantic yet coercive
relationship with his victim;117 Copeland’s resembled a more
traditional pimping operation;118 and Valas’s was based on two
thirty-minute interactions in a hotel room.119 Yet, the cases
suggest that appellate courts will affirm a “reasonable
opportunity to observe” conviction if some combination of the
following factors is present:
1. A defendant’s prior involvement with prostitutes or
knowledge of signs of human trafficking;120
115. See id. at 235 (comparing Valas’s assertion that he spent a total of
fifteen minutes with the victim against her assertion that the time amounted
to one hour).
116. See id. (stating that the jury found that Valas engaged in commercial
sex acts with the victim).
117. See Robinson, 702 F.3d at 35, 38 (describing evidence that Robinson
threatened and used force against Jane Doe over the course of three years).
118. See United States v. Copeland, 820 F.3d 809, 810–11 (5th Cir. 2016)
(describing Copeland’s role in recruiting and training prostitutes for a
multi-victim operation).
119. See United States v. Valas, 822 F.3d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 2016)
(describing Valas’s two interactions with the victim in his hotel room).
120. See Robinson, 702 F.3d at 28 (noting Robinson’s admission of his
involvement with pimping on a previous occasion); see also Copeland, 820 F.3d
at 810 (stating that Copeland was part of an operation that recruited
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2. A defendant’s physical interaction with a victim;121
3. At least a one-hour interaction between a defendant
and victim;122
4. A relationship or established social connection
between a defendant and victim;123
5. A victim’s youthful demeanor;124
6. A victim’s disclosure of minor status;125
7. A victim’s deceitfulness about her age;126
8. A defendant’s knowledge of the background or
underage social network of a victim;127 and
9. A defendant’s participation in the recruitment or
advertisement of a victim’s services.128

prostitutes); Valas, 822 F.3d at 240–41 (concluding that Valas had contacted
multiple prostitutes on Backpage.com and received annual anti-trafficking
training at his work).
121. See Robinson, 702 F.3d at 27, 35 (explaining that Robinson and the
victim physically and intimately interacted over the course of almost three
years); see also Copeland, 820 F.3d at 811 (discussing Copeland’s physical
interaction with the victim when he transported her to meet sex-buyers);
Valas, 822 F.3d at 235, 41 (stating that Valas spent time with the victim in
his hotel room).
122. See Valas, 822 F.3d at 235 (explaining that the victim twice received
$150, which was the price for thirty minutes of her services); see also Copeland,
820 F.3d at 811 (noting that Copeland was with the victim for five days);
Robinson, 702 F.3d at 27, 35 (stating that the defendant and victim interacted
for almost three years).
123. See United States v. Robinson, 702 F.3d 22, 35 (2d Cir. 2012) (stating
that Robinson lived with the victim, which would have put him on notice of
her status as a minor); see also Valas, 822 F.3d at 235 (stating that Valas spoke
on the phone with the victim eighteen times).
124. See Robinson, 702 F.3d at 35–36 (“Jane Doe’s appearance and
demeanor were such that her status as a minor would have been
obvious . . . .”).
125. See Copeland, 820 F.3d at 810 (“T.J. told Wright she was fifteen years
old . . . .”).
126. See Robinson, 702 F.3d at 35 (2d Cir. 2012) (explaining that Jane Doe
told “everybody” that she was nineteen); see also Copeland, 820 F.3d at 810
(noting that the codefendant told the victim to lie about her age); Valas, 822
F.3d at 241 (stating that the victim “billed herself” as nineteen years old).
127. See Robinson, 702 F.3d at 36 (explaining that the defendant likely
knew the victim’s minor status because they met through her sister while the
victim was in high school); see also Valas, 822 F.3d at 241 (stating that the
victim never discussed her background with Valas); Copeland, 820 F.3d at 810
(explaining that the victim discussed her minor status with the codefendant).
128. See Copeland, 820 F.3d at 810 (discussing Copeland’s involvement in
recruiting, taking pictures, and advertising the victim on Backpage.com).
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This factor list displays the current interpretation of 18
U.S.C. § 1591(c)’s “reasonable opportunity to observe” standard.
Nevertheless, as the following section illustrates, this
interpretation is inherently flawed and results in various
criminal enforcement issues by straying from Congress’s
original intent for the statute.
III. A Flawed Factor List: Issues Created by the Current
Interpretation
The utility of the current interpretation of what constitutes
a “reasonable opportunity to observe” is limited and could cause
confusion
among
lower
courts
because
it
both
under-criminalizes and over-criminalizes the offense of sex
trafficking children.
A. Under-Criminalization
Under the current factor list of the interpretation of
§ 1591(c), courts emphasize the importance of a defendant’s
physical interaction with a victim.129 The Copeland court, for
example, highlighted the defendant’s physical interaction with
the victim when he transported her to meet sex-buyers.130 The
Valas court noted that the defendant spent thirty minutes with
the victim in his hotel room on two separate days.131 The
Robinson court emphasized the intimate nature of the
defendant’s and victim’s physical interactions over a
two-and-a-half year period.132 In addition, the Second Circuit
recently upheld jury instructions providing that the defendant

129. See supra Part II.B (labeling physical interaction as a relevant factor
under the current interpretation of the standard).
130. See United States v. Copeland, 820 F.3d 809, 811 (5th Cir. 2016)
(stating that Copeland transported the victim to the locations where she was
sexually assaulted).
131. See United States v. Valas, 822 F.3d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 2016)
(providing the victim’s testimony that Valas paid her twice for thirty minutes
of sexual services).
132. See Robinson, 702 F.3d at 35–36 (stating that the physically intimate
relationship provided a reasonable opportunity for Robinson to observe the
victim).
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had a “reasonable opportunity to observe” the victim if he had a
“face-to-face interaction” with her.133
The emphasis on a physical interaction, however, fails to
achieve Congress’s statutory intent to criminalize a broad range
of sex trafficking conduct.134 Congress stated that its purpose for
passing the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act
of 2000 was to combat the following issues:
Existing legislation and law enforcement in the United
States and other countries are inadequate to deter
trafficking and bring traffickers to justice, failing to reflect
the gravity of the offenses involved. No comprehensive law
exists in the United States that penalizes the range of
offenses involved in the trafficking scheme. Instead, even the
most brutal instances of trafficking in the sex industry are
often punished under laws that also apply to lesser offenses,
so that traffickers typically escape deserved punishment. 135

When Congress amended 18 U.S.C. § 1591 in 2015, it further
stated that its purpose was to “clarify the range of conduct
punished as sex trafficking” in order to thwart the concern that
traffickers were receiving lenient sentences.136
Nevertheless, requiring a physical interaction under the
current interpretation of a “reasonable opportunity to
observe”137 dilutes punishment of “the most brutal instances of
trafficking.”138 It prevents the application of the statute to
modern forms of trafficking that do not involve physical
interactions, such as webcam child sex trafficking139—the
133. See United States v. Corley, 679 F. App’x 1, 5–6 (2d Cir. 2017) (noting
jury instructions that equated a “face-to-face interaction” with a “reasonable
opportunity to observe”).
134. See TVPA of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 112, 114 Stat. 1464 (codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 1591) (criminalizing those who recruit, entice, harbor, transport,
provide, or obtain a sex trafficking victim).
135. Id. § 102(b)(14).
136. See Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-22,
§ 108(c), 129 Stat. 227 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1591) [hereinafter JVTA of 2015]
(describing amendments that serve to reduce demand for sex trafficking).
137. See supra Part II.B (listing a defendant’s physical interaction with a
victim as a relevant factor in assessing whether he had a “reasonable
opportunity to observe” her).
138. TVPA of 2000 § 112.
139. See Sunshine de Leon, Cyber-Sex Trafficking: A 21st Century Scourge,
CNN (Jul. 18, 2013) https://perma.cc/MF44-X6L3 (last visited Jan. 27, 2020)
(describing a cyber form of sex trafficking in which most victims are recruited
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development of which has been a recent, but widespread
addition to the human trafficking industry.140
Webcam child sex trafficking involves perpetrators seeking
live, virtual sex shows from children who are often located
thousands of miles away in another country.141 A computer
screen separates perpetrators from their victims, preventing
any type of physical interaction.142 Parents and relatives are
some of the most common sources of supply in this trafficking
scheme, as they create the shows by pressuring their children to
perform sexual acts or abusing the children on camera
themselves.143 However, the overwhelming demand for these
sex shows fuels the industry.144 According to the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, 750,000 predators are online at any given time
seeking abusive livestreamed shows.145
Investigating online buyers of webcam child sex shows
proves difficult for law enforcement officers.146 Perpetrators are
increasingly gravitating towards this form of trafficking
because of its enhanced sense of anonymity and reduced risk of
detection compared with physically traveling to a location to
meet and exploit a child.147 As one journalist noted, “[C]yber-sex
by friends or family members to perform sex shows on the internet) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
140. See id. (describing webcam sex trafficking and the “newest but not
less sinister world of sexual exploitation”).
141. See, e.g., id. (describing a fourteen-year-old Filipina cyber-sex
trafficking victim who performed online shows for men around the world).
142. See id. (“Anyone who has a computer, internet and a Web cam can be
in business.”).
143. See Martha Mendoza, AP Exclusive: Big Child Webcam Sex Bust
Reveals Rising Abuse, AP NEWS (May 9, 2017), https://perma.cc/G9XR-XPXE
(last visited Jan. 27, 2020) (explaining how impoverished parents and
relatives exploit their children on the internet for easy money) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
144. See id. (stating that the rapid expansion of the crime is an epidemic).
145. See id. (“[A]t any given moment, 750,000 child predators are online.”).
146. See id. (explaining the difficulties in investigating webcam sex
tourism due to the fact that “pedophiles now operate in virtual anonymity”);
see also de Leon, supra note 139 (“[T]he private nature of the technology allows
the crime to take place in a venue that law enforcement can’t easily
access— and that makes it harder to gather evidence against perpetrators.”).
147. See Joshua T. Carback, Cybersex Trafficking: Toward a More Effective
Prosecutorial Response, 43 CRIM. L. BULL. 1, 26 (2018) (“The use of a webcam
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trafficking appears to be the perfect 21st century crime.
Technology has made it easier to access and exploit the
vulnerable, operate illegal activities across borders and more
difficult to discover the identities of those who are behind the
crime.”148
To avoid detection, perpetrators seek and view sex shows
through encrypted livestreams on the dark web.149 They pay
victims with bitcoin, untraceable debit cards, or wire transfers
through Western Union under false names.150 They livestream
the shows to avoid storing incriminating evidence on clouds or
hard drives.151 Even when law enforcement officers detect
suspicious behavior, they have difficulty gathering proof of the
crime due to the private nature of the video shows152—predators
and victims usually “meet” in a chat room before deciding to
take their conversation to a private video stream.153
The purported anonymity of seeking these shows online
attracts predators with particularly heinous sexual fantasies.154
According to the anti-trafficking organization International
Justice Mission, “The more abusive the show, the more the
customer pays.”155 Let’s take a look at one predator who
capitalized on this twisted market. Fleeing multimillion-dollar
fraud allegations, Australian national Peter Scully moved to the

as a modality to sell sexual exploitation for the gratification of foreign buyers
confers purchasers with a greater level of anonymity, and therefore a lesser
degree of risk than physically traveling abroad to exploit children in person.”).
148. De Leon, supra note 139.
149. See Mendoza, supra note 143 (explaining perpetrators’ use of
livestreams to enhance virtual anonymity).
150. See id. (stating that the use of smart phones and wi-fi have led to an
expansion of webcam sex trafficking because predators now use money
transfer services and virtual payment methods).
151. See id. (“By livestreaming, they bypass digital markers law
enforcement embeds in illegal content to catch people downloading, sharing or
saving child pornography on computers or in the Cloud.”).
152. See id. (“Once isolated, pedophiles now operate with virtual
anonymity . . . .”).
153. See id. (discussing the use of chat room groups and online forums to
buy and sell child sex shows).
154. See Cybersex Trafficking, IJM, https://perma.cc/P7FW-DNLT (PDF)
(explaining how predators search online for shows depicting abuse of young
children—some even under the age of two).
155. Id.

KIDS, NOT COMMODITIES

953

Philippines in 2011.156 Over the next four years, Scully recorded
and live streamed films in which he violently raped and abused
young Filipina girls—all at the request of online pedophiles.157
In one film, two young girls are seen digging their own graves
before Scully rapes and strangles them.158 One of these girls was
later found buried underneath his house.159 Another film shows
Scully brutally sexually abusing an eighteen-month-old
infant.160 He dubbed the film Daisy’s Destruction and sold it on
the dark web to thousands of predators worldwide, receiving as
much as $10,000 per individual view.161 While Scully was

156. See Tammy Mills, Chris Vedelago & Lindsay Murdoch, Alleged
Paedophile Peter Gerard Scully Fled a Sordid Past in Melbourne, SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD (Mar. 6, 2015 4:30 PM), https://perma.cc/V9S7-WVDC (last
visited Jan. 22, 2020) (stating that Scully fled Australia to the Philippines
following his involvement in a property scheme that defrauded over twenty
investors of $2.68 million) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
157. See Australian Peter Scully Given Life Sentence for Human
Trafficking, Rape in Philippines, Reports Say, ABC (Jun. 13, 2018 8:55 PM),
https://perma.cc/UW6J-FZSX (last visited Feb. 7, 2019) (explaining Scully’s
production of violent child pornography films) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); see also Mills, Vedelago & Murdoch, supra note 156
(“Police allege Scully, who used the aliases of Peter Ridell and Peter Russell,
orchestrated a scheme where paedophiles paid to live steam videos of children
as young as one being tortured and sexually abused as per their requests.”).
158. See Samuel Osborne, Philippines Signals It Wants to Bring Back
Death Penalty Just So It Can Execute Australian Alleged Paedophile,
INDEPENDENT (Sept. 23, 2016), https://perma.cc/3WWG-L94T (last visited Jan.
22, 2020) (describing the abuse Scully inflicted on various girls) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
159. See Australian Peter Scully Given Life Sentence for Human
Trafficking, Rape in Philippines, Reports Say, supra note 157 (stating that one
victim’s skeleton was discovered buried under a house that Scully had rented).
160. See id. (describing Scully’s abuses).
161. See Rob Waugh, What Is Daisy’s Destruction? ‘Snuff Film’ Urban
Legend Actually Exists, METRO (Sept. 26, 2016), https://perma.cc/NYJ9-53XW
(last visited Jan. 27, 2020) (explaining the demand for the video around the
world) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).

954

77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 931 (2020)

convicted of human trafficking in 2018,162 individuals continue
to trade his film online and avoid law enforcement detection.163
Though Scully’s actions were some of the most horrific and
sadistic instances of child abuse,164 thousands of predators like
him continue to fulfill customers’ requests for webcam child sex
shows.165 The United States does not criminalize webcam or
cybersex trafficking as a federal offense.166 Instead, it
criminalizes these acts under child pornography, online
solicitation, or corruption of children laws,167 which is precisely
what Congress intended to avoid.168 While penalties for
alternative offenses such as child pornography can be severe,169
Congress explicitly enacted 18 U.S.C. § 1591 to ensure that
traffickers were not punished under lesser offenses.170 It also
made clear that its purpose was to criminalize a wide array of
conduct because no law existed at the time that covered the
range of offenses involved in sex trafficking.171 It included a
162. See Candace Sutton, Infamous Pedophile Smiles as He Gets Life in
Prison, N.Y. POST (June 14, 2018), https://perma.cc/PVC6-9EYF (last visited
Jan. 27, 2020) (explaining that Scully was found guilty of human trafficking
in a Philippines court and still faced up to sixty charges for murder, torture,
and abuse) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
163. See Australian Peter Scully Given Life Sentence for Human
Trafficking, Rape in Philippines, Reports Say, supra note 157 (describing the
upload of the video to the internet and its widespread sales).
164. See Osborne, supra note 158 (stating that Scully’s actions were so
depraved that prosecutors and authorities advocated for the Philippines to
reintroduce the death penalty).
165. See Mendoza, supra note 143 (stating that at any given time, there
are 750,000 child predators online).
166. See Bart W. Schermer et. al., Legal Aspects of Sweetie 2.0, LEIDEN U.
(Oct. 3, 2016), https://perma.cc/W2ZJ-4SQX (PDF) (noting the absence of
webcam sex trafficking laws in various countries, including the United States).
167. See id. (providing a chart of the laws that United States federal courts
apply to webcam sex trafficking).
168. See TVPA of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 102(b)(14), 114 Stat. 1464
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1591) (enacting the statute because “[n]o
comprehensive law exists in the United States that penalizes the range of
offenses involved in the trafficking scheme”).
169. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1) (2018) (providing a penalty of up to forty
years imprisonment for certain child pornography offenses).
170. See TVPA of 2000 § 102(b)(14) (“[T]he most brutal instances of
trafficking in the sex industry are often punished under laws that also apply
to lesser offenses, so that traffickers typically escape deserved punishment.”).
171. See id. (“No comprehensive law exists in the United States that
penalizes the range of offenses involved in the trafficking scheme.”).
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variety of activities under the term “sex trafficking” in order to
acknowledge that sex trafficking is not a single, simple action,
but is rather manifest in a plethora of complex and constantly
changing forms.172 Nevertheless, courts have interpreted the
definition to rely heavily on the presence of a physical
interaction between the defendant and victim,173 which prevents
the statute from adapting to developments in technology.
Webcam sex trafficking instances were rare, if not nonexistent,
when Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c) in 2000,174 but as
technology advances, human trafficking only becomes more
complicated.175 The progression of this crime into more
sophisticated realms should not prevent it from being included
in “the range of conduct punished as sex trafficking.”176
Not only does the current interpretation of the statute allow
for under-criminalization of emerging forms of sex trafficking,
but it also over-criminalizes actions that fall outside of
Congress’s definition of sex trafficking. Though Congress
intended to criminalize a comprehensive range of offenses
involved in the trafficking scheme,177 there are certain
actions—though separate criminal offenses in themselves—that
should not be encompassed in the statutory definition of child
sex trafficking. Those actions are discussed in the following
subsection.
B. Over-Criminalization
The current interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c), outlined
in the factor list in Part II.B, problematically considers a
172. See, e.g., What Is Modern Slavery?, ANTI-SLAVERY INT’L., https://
perma.cc/CP69-PP5W (last visited Jan. 27, 2020) (describing the various forms
of human trafficking, such as child slavery, forced marriage, and bonded labor)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
173. See supra Part II.B (describing how courts assess a physical
interaction between the victim and defendant).
174. See Mendoza, supra note 143 (stating that the first high-profile
international case of webcam sex trafficking was reported in 2011).
175. See id. (explaining how the proliferation of smart phones and the
internet paved the way for the expansion of cyber trafficking crimes).
176. JVTA of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-22, § 108(c), 129 Stat. 227 (codified at
18 U.S.C. § 1591).
177. See TVPA of 2000 § 102(b)(14) (providing Congress’s intent to create
a comprehensive law that criminalizes a broad range of trafficking offenses).
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relationship or established social connection between a
defendant and victim as well as a defendant’s knowledge of
signs of human trafficking. The combination of these factors
paves the way for an over-criminalization of individuals to
whom Congress did not intend the statute to apply.178
1. Violation of Legislative Intent
Courts’ current interpretations of the “reasonable
opportunity to observe” standard allows for convictions of people
who are not actually “trafficking children” according to
Congress’s original intent for the statute.179 In passing the child
sex trafficking statute, Congress set out to “combat trafficking
in persons, a contemporary manifestation of slavery whose
victims are predominantly women and children, to ensure just
and effective punishment of traffickers, and to protect their
victims.”180 It further stated:
It is the sense of Congress that . . . a sex trafficker [is] a
person who “knowingly . . . recruits, entices, harbors,
transports, provides, obtains, or maintains by any means a
person . . . knowing, or in reckless disregard of the fact, that
means of force, threats of force, fraud, coercion . . . or any
combination of such means will be used to cause the person
to engage in a commercial sex act, or that the person has not
attained the age of 18 years and will be caused to engage in
a commercial sex act.”181

According to the stated legislative intent, sex trafficking
encompasses a wide variety of criminal activities.182 Those who
engage in the most pervasive forms of sex trafficking would
unquestionably be categorized as sex traffickers under the
Act.183 For instance, the definition of “sex trafficker” includes
persons who lure undocumented populations into the United
States with false promises of jobs184 because they knowingly
178. See id. § 102(a) (enacting 18 U.S.C. § 1591 in order to combat
trafficking in persons, slavery, and involuntary servitude).
179. See id. § 102(b) (explaining the definition of human trafficking).
180. Id. § 102(a).
181. JVTA of 2015 § 108 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1591).
182. See id. (criminalizing seven different actions).
183. See id. (providing that those who knowingly cause another person to
engage in a commercial sex act are sex traffickers).
184. See What Is Modern Slavery?, supra note 172 (stating that traffickers
will often promise a fake new job to someone living in poverty).
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recruit, entice, harbor, and transport the victims.185 Moreover,
Congress would certainly deem as sex traffickers parents who
sell their child’s virginity,186 as well as business owners who
exploit undocumented employees to sell sex,187 and “financial
lenders” who offer impoverished individuals loans with
exorbitant interest rates that they then force the borrowers to
pay off through prostitution.188 The statute’s definition of a sex
trafficker also encompasses traditional pimps who engage in
complex, manipulative, and violent tactics to recruit and force
children to enter the prostitution industry.189
Nonetheless, despite the broad range of activities covered
under 18 U.S.C. § 1591, courts should not allow certain behavior
to be criminalized under the statute. Importantly, sex
trafficking children and soliciting a prostitute must be
recognized as two distinct criminal actions that carry different
consequences. It is crucial to first understand the difference
between sex trafficking and prostitution. Only adults can be
prostitutes, while both adults and children can be sex trafficking

185. See TVPA of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 112, 114 Stat. 1464 (codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 1591) (providing that a sex trafficker is a person who knowingly
recruits, entices, or transports a victim).
186. See Russell Goldman, Utah Mother Tried to Sell Daughter’s Virginity
for $10,000, Say Cops, ABC NEWS (May 24, 2011), https://perma.cc/EBQ8CD6V (last visited Jan. 27, 2020) (explaining that Felicia McClure attempted
to sell her thirteen-year-old daughter’s virginity against the daughter’s
wishes) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
187. See Human Trafficking—Exploitation of Illegal Aliens, FAIR (Aug.
2016), https://perma.cc/DZV5-EJNX (last visited Mar. 7, 2020) (“While anyone
can become a victim of trafficking, illegal aliens are highly vulnerable to being
trafficked due to a combination of factors, including lack of legal status and
protections, limited language skills and employment options, poverty and
immigration-related debts, and social isolation.”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
188. See Debt vs. Debt-Bondage: What’s the Difference?, POLARIS BLOG
(Mar. 1, 2016), https://perma.cc/MU6S-ZZTB (last visited Jan. 27, 2020)
(explaining that traffickers impose unreasonable interest rates on loans, often
as high as 400%, and convince victims that they must prostitute to pay off the
debt) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
189. See LINDA SMITH & CINDY COLOMA, RENTING LACY: A STORY OF
AMERICA’S PROSTITUTED CHILDREN 76 (Shared Hope Int’l ed., 2013) (describing
how a pimp manipulates child victims).
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victims.190 Many scholars argue that there is no such thing as a
“child prostitute” because young children cannot legally consent
to sex, and thus cannot freely choose to become prostitutes.191
Adults, on the other hand, can be trafficked into the prostitution
industry or they can enter it through their own volition.192
Therefore, though the merits and reasoning behind it can be
debated,193 a distinction remains between those who sell sex: an
190. See What’s Wrong with Calling a Child a Prostitute?, SHARED HOPE
INT’L (Jan. 7, 2010), https://perma.cc/MH5K-U3CA (last visited Jan. 31, 2020)
(“A child cannot be a prostitute because she/he is a victim of commercial sexual
exploitation and the federal law defines this child as a victim of sex
trafficking.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
191. See id. (noting that under federal law, all minors engaged in
commercial sex acts are classified as trafficking victims); see also Samantha
Cowan, Why Sex-Trafficked Children Can’t Be Called Prostitutes, TAKE PART
(Sept. 23, 2015), https://perma.cc/3NJA-479R (last visited Jan. 31, 2020)
(stating that the term “child prostitute” is “misleading because it suggests
consent and criminality when none exists”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review); Malika Saada Saar, There Is No Such Thing as a Child
Prostitute, WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2014), https://perma.cc/K65T-66UJ (last
visited Jan. 30, 2020) (explaining that because vulnerable children are
exploited and forced against their will to sell sex, they cannot ever truly
“choose” to become prostitutes) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
192. See Kelly J. Bell, A Feminist’s Argument on How Sex Work Can
Benefit Women, INQUIRIES J. (2009), https://perma.cc/BRV6-47Y2 (last visited
Jan. 31, 2020) (explaining the argument that sex work is not always a form of
violence, but can be a choice for women) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review); see also Should Prostitution Be a Normal Profession?, BBC,
https://perma.cc/A4G3-YJLB (last visited Jan. 31) (detailing an interview with
a prostitute who said, “I do this on my own choice” because she needed to pay
rent until she found another job) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). But see Julie Bindel, Most ‘Sex Workers’ Are Modern-Day Slaves,
SPECTATOR (Aug. 19, 2017), https://perma.cc/43VF-J4Q6 (last visited Jan. 31,
2020) (“Prostitution is rarely, if ever, a choice.”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); Natasha Guynes, Sex Work Is Almost Never a Choice,
MARIECLAIRE (Aug. 30, 2018), https://perma.cc/48RS-5UBE (last visited Jan.
31, 2020) (“The most common words I hear from the women who come to [my
non-profit organization]: ‘I don’t have a choice.’”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
193. See Bindel, supra note 192 (arguing that women never become
prostitutes out of true free will because “whatever lobbyists say, women and
girls in prostitution are overwhelmingly from abusive backgrounds, living in
poverty, and otherwise marginalised. They are not free or empowered: they
are abused and trapped”); see also Guynes, supra note 192 (explaining that
women are pushed into prostitution by poverty and necessity, not by choice or
a desire to perform sex work); Freddy Hayes, Treat Prostitutes as Victims, Not
Criminals, DALLAS NEWS (Apr. 21, 2017), https://perma.cc/ATR8-NRPA (last
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adult is typically assumed to be a prostitute unless she indicates
that she did not willingly choose that line of work, while a child
is automatically considered a sex trafficking victim due to her
age.194
Based on this line of reasoning, this section focuses on men
who solicit prostitutes—that is, adult sellers of sex. Men who
solicit prostitutes are not pimps—they are those who purchase
sexual services from prostitutes.195 This section argues that this
category of men who have good-faith—albeit illegal—intentions
to solicit of-age prostitutes are not, and should not,
automatically be criminalized as child sex traffickers when the
victim is found to be underage.196
Recognizing the need to distinguish between soliciting a
prostitute and trafficking children in no way disregards the
great harm caused by those who solicit prostitutes. Prostitution
undoubtedly dehumanizes women and is an inherently
dangerous industry.197 Prostitutes are exposed to higher
likelihoods of rape, physical violence, post-traumatic stress
disorder, and even murder.198 In fact, it is often argued that
visited Jan. 31, 2020) (“There is a misconception that women choose to go into
prostitution because it is a quick way to make easy money. However, the vast
majority of these women are forced to engage in prostitution.”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
194. See What’s Wrong with Calling a Child a Prostitute?, supra note 190
(stating that children engaged in commercial sex acts are automatically
deemed trafficking victims under federal law).
195. See John, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2020) (stating
that a john is “a prostitute’s client”).
196. See JVTA of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-22, § 108, 129 Stat. 227 (codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 1591) (stating that those who purchase sexual acts from
trafficking victims should be criminalized only if merited by the facts of the
case).
197. See Bureau of Public Affairs, The Link Between Prostitution and Sex
Trafficking, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Nov. 24, 2004), https://perma.cc/NJC3-7SL9
(last visited Jan. 27, 2020) (“The U.S. Government adopted a strong position
against legalized prostitution . . . based on evidence that prostitution is
inherently harmful and dehumanizing, and fuels trafficking in persons, a form
of modern-day slavery.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
198. See id. (stating the results of a study showing that sixty to seventy
percent of prostitutes had been raped; seventy to ninety-five percent had been
physically assaulted; and sixty-eight percent met the criteria for
post-traumatic stress disorder); see also Devon Brewer et al., Extent, Trends,
and Perpetrators of Prostitution-Related Homicide in the United States, 51 J.
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prostitution fuels sex trafficking by feeding the demand for
commercial sex and providing a “façade behind which traffickers
for sexual exploitation operate.”199 In other words, prostitution,
especially when legalized, allows trafficking victims to hide in
plain sight—to an outside observer, a trafficked victim would
appear to be willfully prostituting herself.200 Men who solicit
prostitutes provide the necessary demand to fuel both of these
violent industries and are to blame for perpetuating this form of
violence against women.201 These men are, and should be, held
accountable.
This Note in no way argues that men who solicit or attempt
to solicit adult prostitutes should be free from criminal liability.
In fact, other countries have shown that focusing prosecutions
on the demand for prostitution—the men who purchase
sex— can lead to a sharp decrease in sex trafficking.202 However,
this Note suggests that soliciting or attempting to solicit an
adult prostitute is less morally culpable than sex trafficking
children. Men who seek out a prostitute, and who have perhaps
been duped by pimps or victims themselves about the victim’s
age, should not face the same liability as if they had sex
trafficked children. A child sex trafficking conviction results in
FORENSIC SCI. 1101, 1107 (2006) (finding that prostitutes have the highest
homicide victimization rate of any set of women ever studied).
199. See Bureau of Public Affairs, supra note 197
Prostitution and related activities—including pimping and
patronizing or maintaining brothels—fuel the growth of
modern-day slavery by providing a façade behind which traffickers
for sexual exploitation operate. Where prostitution is legalized or
tolerated, there is a greater demand for human trafficking victims
and nearly always an increase in the number of women and
children trafficked into commercial sex slavery.
200. See Rachel Lloyd, Legalizing Prostitution Leads to More Trafficking,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2015), https://perma.cc/E6X3-AL87 (last visited Jan. 31,
2020) (explaining that legalization of prostitution in some countries has led to
an increase in trafficking because traffickers recruit children and
marginalized women to meet the increased demand for commercial sex) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
201. See id. (quoting the Swedish Government’s position that
“[i]nternational trafficking in human beings could not flourish but for the
existence of local prostitution markets where men are willing and able to buy
and sell women and children for sexual exploitation”).
202. See id. (stating that in 1999 the Swedish government began
aggressively prosecuting customers—instead of prostitutes—and saw a
seventy-five percent decrease in men buying sex, thus reducing the overall size
of the country’s prostitution and sex trafficking industries).
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at least a ten-year imprisonment sentence and at most a life
sentence.203 If not given a life sentence, a convicted person must
register as a sex offender,204 which has drastic consequences
including permanently limiting where he can live, work,
socialize, and travel.205 On the other hand, soliciting a prostitute
is typically a state-level offense206 that does not require sex
offender registration and generally results in a maximum
incarceration period of one year for a first-time offense.207
One man who represents the importance of distinguishing
between attempting to solicit an adult prostitute and child sex
trafficking is Raymond Valas.208 Valas did not engage in any of
the widespread forms of modern-day trafficking.209 He did not
enslave, kidnap, sell, collect proceeds from, or smuggle the
victim.210 Rather, he went on Backpage.com, sent messages to a
variety of prostitutes advertising their services, and met up with
203. See 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b)(1) (2018) (stating that a defendant will be
sentenced to a term of imprisonment “not less than 10 years or for life”); see
also 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b)(2) (providing that the minimum period of
incarceration increases to fifteen years if the offense involved force, threats of
force, fraud, or coercion); 18 U.S.C. § 1591(d) (describing an additional penalty
of twenty-five years of imprisonment for obstructing the enforcement of the
child sex trafficking statute).
204. See 34 U.S.C. § 20911(1), (3)(A)(i) (2018), (providing that any
defendant convicted of a sex offense must register as a sex offender and stating
that sex trafficking under 18 U.S.C. § 1591 is a Tier II sex offense).
205. See Fenzel et al., Understanding Collateral Consequences of Registry
Laws: An Examination of the Perceptions of Sex Offender Registrants, 11 JUST.
POL’Y J. 1, 4 (2014) (describing the collateral consequences of sex offender
registration).
206. Soliciting a prostitute can be prosecuted under various federal laws,
such as 18 U.S.C. 2422(b) (2018), but it is much more frequently charged at
the state level. See generally U.S. Federal and State Prostitution Laws and
Related Punishments, PROCON, https://perma.cc/YDL3-5T3Q?type=image
(last visited Jan. 28, 2020) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
207. See id. (providing examples of state level solicitation of a prostitution
penalties, including a maximum incarceration period of thirty days in
Arkansas, six months in California, and one year in Georgia).
208. United States v. Valas, 822 F.3d 228, 248 (5th Cir. 2016).
209. Compare G.A. Res. 55/25, at 32 (Nov. 15, 2000) (defining human
trafficking as using threats, force, coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, or
abuse of power to exploit another person), with Valas, 822 F.3d at 240
(explaining that the defendant claimed that he attempted to hire an adult
prostitute, as the victim’s advertisement stated that she was nineteen).
210. See Valas, 822 F.3d at 235 (explaining that the defendant solicited
the victim to perform commercial sex acts).
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one of them who, unbeknownst to him, was a minor.211 Valas,
and others like him, could undoubtedly be prosecuted for
attempting to solicit a prostitute.212 Instead, due to the strict
liability nature of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c), Valas was convicted of
child sex trafficking because he “purchase[d] illicit sexual acts
from” a trafficking victim.213
Some might argue that Valas’s behavior was precisely what
Congress intended to criminalize when it enacted 18 U.S.C.
§ 1591. In fact, Congress added the words “solicits or patronizes”
to the list of activities criminalized under the statute to make
“absolutely clear for judges, juries, prosecutors, and law
enforcement officials that criminals who purchase sexual acts
from human trafficking victims may be arrested, prosecuted,
and convicted as sex trafficking offenders when this is merited
by the facts of a particular case.”214 Nevertheless, the final
clause of this sentence is key.215 Criminalizing typical
sex-buyers like Valas without assessing whether the facts of the
case merit a distinction diminishes the congressional purpose of
the statute.216
Even if, despite his denial,217 Valas knew he was “obtaining”
or “soliciting” an underage trafficking victim,218 thus placing his
conviction squarely within the statute’s parameters, his case
still raises the issue of when criminalization of
similarly-situated sex-buyers would be—and more importantly,
would not be—“merited by the facts of the case.”219 Knowledge
211. See id. (stating that the defendant hired the victim through her
Backpage.com advertisement which claimed she was an adult).
212. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-346(B) (2019) (“Any person who offers
money or its equivalent to another for the purpose of engaging in sexual acts
. . . shall be guilty of solicitation of prostitution . . . .”).
213. See JVTA of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-22, § 109(2), 129 Stat. 227 (codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 1591) (stating that courts have interpreted the term “obtain” to
encompass those who purchase illicit sexual acts from trafficking victims).
214. Id. § 109(4).
215. See id. (stating that criminalization of sex-buyers must be merited by
the facts of a particular case).
216. See id. (describing the statute’s purpose).
217. See Valas, 822 F.3d at 241 (discussing Valas’s naiveté defense based
on the victim’s advertisement which stated that she was a nineteen-year-old
prostitute).
218. See JVTA of 2015 § 109(1) (defining a sex trafficker as one who
knowingly obtains or solicits a victim).
219. Id. at § 109(4).
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that the victim is, in fact, a victim of human trafficking should
merit such factual distinction.220 However, if a defendant
attempts to solicit an adult prostitute and is unaware that the
person who shows up to meet him is an underage human
trafficking victim, his pre-conceived expectations of this person
might render his “opportunity to observe” unreasonable under
§ 1591(c). In other words, if a defendant utilized a service such
as Backpage.com and ordered the services of a prostitute who
held herself out to be twenty years old, then that defendant
would expect a twenty-year-old woman to show up to meet him.
He would have ample “opportunity to observe” her, but how
could he reasonably be expected to ascertain her true age of, say
seventeen, or her status as a trafficking victim? If ascertaining
her true age is an unreasonable expectation, then his
opportunity to observe her must, too, be unreasonable under
§ 1591(c).
Therefore, given the drastic differences in both culpability
and conviction consequences between sex trafficking children
and attempting to solicit an adult prostitute, courts should
carefully distinguish between the two actions when assessing a
defendant’s “opportunity to observe” a victim.
2. “Relationships” Between Defendants and Victims
One might argue that 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c) already
distinguishes sex trafficking from attempting to solicit an adult
prostitute by considering the existence of “a relationship or
established social connection between a defendant and
victim.”221 A violent, coercive relationship with unbalanced
power dynamics, for instance, is illuminative of a defendant’s
observation opportunity of a victim and may merit labeling him
a sex trafficker.222 In other words, the existence of an abusive
relationship between a defendant and victim could be evidence

220. See, e.g., United States v. Jungers, 702 F.3d 1066, 1073 (8th Cir. 2013)
(stating that a man who responded to an advertisement offering an
eleven-year-old girl for sex knowingly enticed her).
221. See supra Part II.B.
222. See United States v. Robinson, 702 F.3d 22, 28 (2d Cir. 2012)
(discussing Robinson’s repeated threats to kill the victim if she left him or
failed to pay him).
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that the defendant is a pimp engaged in sex trafficking.223 On
the other hand, a man who merely attempted to solicit a
prostitute would have no former social connection to the victim,
which would diminish the reasonableness of any observation
opportunity he had with the victim.
Nonetheless, a danger exists in encouraging courts to
broadly consider the existence of a relationship between a
defendant and victim. To some, Robinson’s conviction might
seem unfair because the victim adamantly testified that
Robinson was her boyfriend and in no way her trafficker or
pimp.224 Other defendants might present similar evidence that
they were in a romantic relationship with the victim, which, if
coupled with a lack of evidence of abuse or violence and a
victim’s testimony that she prostituted out of her own free will,
could weigh against a finding of sex trafficking.225 However, the
victim’s response in Robinson is typical of child sex trafficking
victims.226 Trafficking victims often believe their pimps are their
boyfriends due to the pimp’s manipulative recruitment
tactics.227 Pimps frequently target young, vulnerable girls who
have low self-esteem.228 Foster children, runaways, and the

223. See Katherine Lymn & Amy Dalrymple, Manipulation and Threats
from Pimps Keep Victims in the Life of Prostitution Unwillingly, BILLINGS
GAZETTE (Jan. 6, 2015), https://perma.cc/2AML-6BYL (last visited Jan. 28,
2020) (“Experts say trafficking shares the dynamic of domestic violence . . . .”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
224. See Robinson, 702 F.3d at 27 (“Throughout the trial, Jane Doe
insisted that Robinson was her boyfriend rather than her pimp, and that he
was only living off of her income as a prostitute rather than facilitating that
line of work.”).
225. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2018) (providing that force and coercion
are elements of sex trafficking of children).
226. See Lisa Holl Chang, Comment, Reaching Safe Harbor: A Path for
Sex-Trafficking Victims in Wisconsin, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 1489, 1497 (explaining
that traffickers convince vulnerable girls to enter the commercial sex industry
by posing as their boyfriends).
227. See SHI Staff, Why Her? What You Need to Know About How Pimps
Choose, SHARED HOPE INT’L (Apr. 10, 2013), https://perma.cc/PN8Y-TSZE (last
visited Jan. 27, 2020) (identifying the four steps of recruitment as identifying
the need of the child, fulfilling the need, removing any other sources of need
fulfillment, and exploiting the child’s dependence for need fulfillment) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
228. See SMITH & COLOMA, supra note 189, at 75 (“Pimps find it easiest to
manipulate vulnerable girls with low self-esteem, girls from troubled homes,
foster children, runaways, and sometimes the mentally disabled.”).
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mentally disabled often meet these criteria.229 In Renting Lacy:
A Story of America’s Prostituted Children, Linda Smith and
Cindy Coloma describe the “courtship” process:
The pimp will introduce himself and gradually get to know a
girl. He will listen to her problems and act like he cares. He
may shower her with gifts and compliments. Perhaps he’ll
provide her with food and a place to sleep at night. However,
he’ll always establish himself as the victim’s “boyfriend,”
creating a sense of protection and security. This period can
last anywhere from a few days to several months. 230

Following courtship, the pimp strategically isolates the
victim from friends and family in order to increase her
dependence on him.231 He then gradually introduces physical
violence into the relationship.232 One article explains, “Pimp
control is the art of making a girl feel wanted, enough that she
suffers the punches for the emotional connection.”233
Eventually, through abuse and manipulation of their
“relationship,” the pimp convinces the victim that she wants to
be a prostitute—she will do anything to protect her relationship
after her pimp has brainwashed her into thinking only he will
provide for, protect, and love her.234 “You wait on your man hand
229. See id. (explaining that these categories of girls are often targeted
because of their vulnerability and loneliness).
230. Id. at 75–76.
231. See id. at 76
As the pimp listens to the youth’s “troubles” at home or school, and
as he is establishing himself as her savior, the pimp also works to
isolate the child from those who may object to their relationship.
The strategic removal of friends and family members ensures, as
the relationship shifts from caring to exploitative, that the child will
have no one to turn to other than the pimp.
232. See id. at 76–77
A pimp typically, however, uses a mixture of love and affection with
anger and violence. He’s quick to fluctuate between the two states.
He may tell one of his girls he loves her and in the next minute slap
her across the face. This creates a powerful combination of love and
fear that makes the victim obedient.
233. Lymn & Dalrymple, supra note 223.
234. See SMITH & COLOMA, supra note 189, at 76 (stating that after the
isolation period, the pimp will gradually introduce the idea of prostitution
through various manipulative tactics); see also Lymn & Dalrymple, supra note
223 (“Through psychological manipulation, the pimp brainwashes his victims
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and foot,” one former prostitute described.235 “You go to prison
for him, you take cases for him, you go get his money every
night, rain, sleet or snow. You pull other women for him.”236
The pimp knows how to maintain power.237 As Smith and
Coloma described,
The pimp’s primary focus is control: controlling every
movement the girls make and every dollar they bring in. The
physical control is easier to identify and observe; the
psychological abuse can be more difficult to understand. A
girl who is frequently beaten, cut, raped, and tortured is
guaranteed to do everything the pimp wants her to do. 238

Iceberg Slim, a renowned pimp, described how he executes this
practice: “I want to be the boss of her life, even her thoughts. I
got to con them that Lincoln never freed the slaves.”239 Another
pimp stated, “After you have broken her spirit, she has no sense
of self-value. Now pimp, put a price tag on the item you have
manufactured.”240
The prolonged abuse and exploitation often blinds victims
to the reality of their situations, and they continue to believe
their pimps are their boyfriends.241 The emotional element of the
“relationship” is commonly the only thing keeping victims from
leaving.242 Therefore, taking into account the existence of a
relationship243 between the defendant and victim in “reasonable
opportunity to observe” analyses is problematic and
counterproductive. It might marginally aid in preventing the
over-criminalization of sex-buyers (who, unlike pimps, have no
into thinking only he can provide for them and that no one else understands
them . . . .”).
235. Lymn & Dalrymple, supra note 223.
236. Id.
237. See SMITH & COLOMA, supra note 189, at 76–77 (explaining the
“powerful combination of love and fear” that pimps implement in their
processes of controlling a victim).
238. Id. at 76.
239. RODRIGUEZ, supra note 28, at 46.
240. Id.
241. See SMITH & COLOMA, supra note 189, at 76 (stating that the pimp
always establishes himself as the victim’s boyfriend in order to create a sense
of security).
242. See Lymn & Dalrymple, supra note 223 (“If not for the emotional
element, the girls would leave . . . .”).
243. See supra Part II.B (providing “a relationship or established social
connection between a defendant and victim” as a factor).
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prior relationship with a victim), but only at the expense of
inadequately protecting victims. A better way to prevent
over-criminalization, to be discussed in the following subsection,
is to eliminate the consideration of “knowledge of signs of
human trafficking” from § 1591(c) analyses.
3. Knowledge of Signs of Sex Trafficking: Research vs. Direct
Contact
According to the “reasonable opportunity to observe” factor
list, courts take into account a defendant’s knowledge of signs of
human
trafficking,244
which
perhaps
prevents
the
over-criminalization of non-traffickers engaged in distinct
behavior such as attempting to solicit an adult prostitute.245
Under this theory, it is reasonable to apply the child sex
trafficking statute to a person who claims he believed he was
with an of-age prostitute if he has a previous criminal history,
for example, of sex trafficking children. His criminal history
would demonstrate a likely knowledge of the signs and dangers
of human trafficking, so he either knew or should have known
that he was with a child sex trafficking victim based on his prior
experiences.
However, the broad categorization of this factor as
“knowledge of signs of human trafficking”246 still paves the way
for over-criminalization. The factor not only encompasses
human trafficking criminal histories, but also work-related
training and academic research.247 The Valas court, for
instance, noted the relevancy of a Department of Defense
PowerPoint presentation used by the prosecution to prove
Valas’s awareness of the signs of human trafficking.248 The court
stated that “as a Lieutenant Colonel in the United States Army,
244. See supra Part II.B (providing “prior involvement with prostitutes or
knowledge of signs of human trafficking” as a factor).
245. See United States v. Valas, 822 F.3d 228, 241 (5th Cir. 2016)
(explaining that Valas’s admission that he attended anti-trafficking training
cast doubt on his defense that he believed the victim was an adult).
246. See supra Part II.B.
247. See Valas, 822 F.3d at 241 (noting evidence that the defendant
attended an annual anti-trafficking training).
248. See id. (stating that the PowerPoint presentation made it more likely
that Valas contacted the victim for a sexual encounter, rather than for a
research project).
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[Valas] was trained on human trafficking annually: its signs,
dangers, and horrors.”249 It concluded that the PowerPoint
presentation made it more probable that Valas contacted the
victim for sexual relations rather than to conduct a research
interview as he defended because “a career Army officer who
takes annual human trafficking awareness training is informed
not to invite a prostitute into his private hotel room for an
‘interview.’”250 It was irrelevant to the court that Valas testified
he could not recall whether he had seen that precise PowerPoint
presentation.251 The court stated, “Even if these were not the
exact slides that Valas trained on, they at a minimum alerted
the jury to the type of training Valas would have
experienced.”252
Allowing this factor of knowledge of human trafficking to
encompass work-related trainings expands the crime of child
sex trafficking. If Valas spent a total of only one hour conversing
with his victim yet still met the standard because he admitted
to previously receiving anti-trafficking training,253 then there
might be no scenario in which a court would conclude that a
defendant with prior training interacted with a sex trafficking
victim but had an insufficient “opportunity to observe” her. In
other words, does one’s attendance at an anti-trafficking
training necessarily mean he will be able to spot the signs of it
in a potential victim? Is it fair to hold defendants to such a
standard?
The factor should be narrowed to avoid unjust results.
Attending training sessions on human trafficking is very
different from gathering first-hand experience through directly
interacting with victims.254 Compare, for example, the histories
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. See id. (declaring that the use of the slides was proper even though
Valas could not remember if he had seen them before).
252. Id.
253. See id. at 235, 241 (explaining that Valas spent thirty minutes with
the victim on two separate days, never discussed her background, and
conversed with her only about her appearance’s similarity to her
Backpage.com photos).
254. See Diane Cole, A Message from Your Brain: I’m Not Good at
Remembering What I Hear, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Mar. 13, 2014), https://
perma.cc/6EW4-RZ4Z (last visited Jan. 28, 2020) (describing a study that
found that people remember tactile experiences with more regularity than
auditory experiences) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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of Robinson and Valas.255 Both have experiences that satisfy the
factor of “knowledge of human trafficking,” but in starkly
different ways. Robinson admitted to pimping multiple times in
the past,256 which falls under the same factor category as Valas’s
attendance at a human trafficking PowerPoint presentation.257
Had the court not given a life sentence to Ian Sean Gordon,
Alyssa Beck’s trafficker,258 his sex trafficking conviction259 could
be assessed at a subsequent criminal proceeding in the same
manner as a former flight attendant’s standard work training
that instructed staff to be on the lookout for certain signs that a
traveler might be a victim of human trafficking.260 A court could
find that an employee at a shelter for trafficking victims who
used his position to recruit and sell victims261 had “knowledge of

255. Compare United States v. Robinson, 702 F.3d 22, 27 (2d Cir. 2012)
(describing the two-and-a-half year pimping relationship between the
defendant and victim), with Valas, 822 F.3d at 241 (noting the significance of
an anti-trafficking training presentation which Valas may not have even
remembered).
256. See Robinson, 702 F.3d at 28 (discussing Robinson’s prior
involvement with pimping).
257. See United States v. Valas, 822 F.3d 228, 241 (5th Cir. 2016)
(discussing Valas’s annual anti-trafficking work training).
258. See supra Part I (describing the story of a fifteen-year-old girl who
was sex trafficked).
259. See Miller, supra note 1 (stating that Gordon pleaded guilty to sex
trafficking and was sentenced to life in prison).
260. See Meet the Abduction Survivor Helping Airlines Stop Human
Trafficking, CNN (Oct. 17, 2019), https://perma.cc/P5RC-E4JC?type=image
(last visited Jan. 28, 2020) (describing various ways to identify trafficking
victims in airports such as looking for those who have tattoos, are not dressed
appropriately, and are afraid to discuss their destination or travel plans) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
261. See Former Staff Mentor at Florida Keys Children’s Shelter Convicted
of Child Sex Trafficking, FBI (Nov. 6, 2015), https://perma.cc/GJ98-RPRM
(last visited Mar. 7, 2020) (discussing how an employee recruited girls from a
youth shelter to become prostitutes) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); see also Deanna Hackney, Arizona Migrant Shelter Worker Accused
of Sexually Abusing Teenage Boys, CNN (Aug. 4, 2018), https://perma.cc
/HRM9-FMNS (last visited Jan. 28, 2020) (describing how a shelter employee
abused migrant children who were at risk for trafficking) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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signs of human trafficking” in the same way as a college student
who once wrote a research paper on human trafficking.262
Robinson, Gordon, and the shelter employee are much less
likely to forget the details of their direct experiences with
victims than Valas, the flight attendant, or the college
student.263 Indeed, Valas admitted to attending annual
anti-trafficking training, but testified he could not remember
the training or if he had seen the exact slides offered by the
prosecution.264 He, and other employees, are under no obligation
to remember or even pay attention during a couple-hour work
training, but courts can assume that defendants remember such
trainings and apply the information to their interactions with
potential victims years after the trainings have concluded.265
Direct contact with victims provides a much deeper basis of
knowledge than academic research or work-related training,266
yet courts erroneously treat the two experiences as the same in
their assessments of § 1591(c)’s factor of “knowledge of signs of
human trafficking.”267
The outlined issues with the current interpretation of what
evidence is necessary to show a “reasonable opportunity to
observe” a child sex trafficking victim display a need to clarify
the standard. To eradicate the issues of both under- and
over-criminalization, the next section advocates a revised factor
list that courts should use when assessing evidence under
§ 1591(c).

262. See UMass-Amherst Offers Intro to Human Trafficking Online Class
to Raise Awareness, MASSLIVE (Jul. 26, 2017), https://perma.cc/DR8U-35GE
(last visited Jan. 28, 2020) (describing an online course which aims to teach
students how to spot signs of human trafficking) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
263. See Cole, supra note 254 (explaining that people remember what they
hear far less often than they remember what they see or touch).
264. See Valas, 822 F.3d at 241 (stating that Valas could not remember
whether the slides depicted the exact training he received).
265. See id. (declaring that even if Valas did not remember the training, it
was similar enough to what he experienced).
266. See Cole, supra note 254 (discussing the differences in memory recall
depending on “whether we see it, hear it, or touch it”).
267. See supra Part II.B.
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IV. A Better Approach for Victims and Defendants
As demonstrated in Part III, the current factor list that
courts use to assess whether a defendant had a “reasonable
opportunity to observe” a victim is inherently flawed. This
section recommends solutions to mend the problematic factors
and advocates for a new list of factors that courts should
consider when assessing whether evidence is sufficient to satisfy
§ 1591(c). This new list is a more efficient and effective way to
protect victims of various forms of sex trafficking while
simultaneously safeguarding defendants from being convicted
of crimes that do not match their level of culpability.
A. Under-Criminalization Due to Emphasis on Physical
Interaction
As discussed, courts consider whether a defendant had a
physical interaction with a victim when evaluating evidence
under § 1591(c).268 Webcam sex trafficking raises the issue of
whether a perpetrator can reasonably observe a victim by
viewing a virtual depiction of that person.269 Courts can better
protect victims of webcam sex trafficking and the statute’s
legislative intent270 if they expand the emphasis on physical
interactions to include virtual interactions. Restricting the
factor to in-person or face-to-face communications prevents the
statute from adapting to developments in technology.271 While
in 2000,272 Congress had no way of predicting that human
trafficking would rapidly inhabit the cyberworld with
268. See supra Part II.B (providing a defendant’s “physical interaction
with a victim” as a relevant factor to interpreting the statute).
269. See supra Part III.A (explaining how the factor list fails to incorporate
virtual interactions).
270. See TVPA of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 112, 114 Stat. 1464 (codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 1591) (explaining that Congress enacted the statute because no
law existed that covered the range of activities in the human trafficking
scheme).
271. See Mendoza, supra note 143 (“The relatively new crime of webcam
sex tourism is spreading rapidly, with new digital technologies sparking what
the United Nations call an ‘alarming growth of new forms of child sexual
exploitation online.’”).
272. See generally TVPA of 2000 § 1 (providing that the statute was
enacted in 2000).
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perpetrators flocking to the internet to exploit victims, this new
virtual crime cannot reasonably be excluded from the “range of
conduct punished as sex trafficking.”273 Congress selected this
broad language precisely to allow the law to adapt to unexpected
developments in the trafficking industry.274 Requiring that the
statute only encompass those crimes that existed when
Congress enacted it would be inefficient and contrary to the
statute’s purpose.275 But most importantly, it would leave
victims desperately vulnerable and unprotected.276 Therefore,
the interpretive factor should be amended to guide courts to
consider “a physical or virtual interaction between a defendant
and victim.”
B. Over-Criminalization in Violation of Legislative Intent
Congress intended to criminalize modern forms of
slavery,277 but the current factor list allows criminalization of
sex-buyers who seek to solicit an adult prostitute.278 While this,
of course, is criminally punishable behavior,279 it does not
always fall under the category of sex trafficking or merit the
higher sentences and consequences that come with a sex
trafficking conviction.280 A man who expects to briefly interact
with an adult prostitute might not have a “reasonable

273. JVTA of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-22, § 108(c), 129 Stat. 227 (codified at
18 U.S.C. § 1591).
274. See id. § 109(1) (enacting the statute because no law existed that
criminalized all behavior under the umbrella term of “sex trafficking”).
275. See TVPA of 2000 § 102(a) (stating the purpose to combat the
contemporary manifestation of trafficking in persons).
276. See supra Part III.A (explaining how victims of virtual trafficking are
unprotected).
277. See TVPA of 2000 § 102(a) (“The purposes of this division are to
combat trafficking in persons, a contemporary manifestation of slavery whose
victims are predominantly women and children, to ensure just and effective
punishment of traffickers, and to protect their victims.”).
278. See supra Part III.B (explaining how the application of the current
factors over-criminalizes certain groups of people).
279. See 18 U.S.C. § 2422 (2018) (criminalizing the solicitation of a
prostitute); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (2018) (criminalizing the promotion of
prostitution); U.S. Federal and State Prostitution Laws and Related
Punishments, supra note 206 (providing each state’s penalties for solicitation
of a prostitute).
280. See supra Part III.B.
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opportunity to observe” a victim who has held herself out to be
of legal age.281
To remedy this issue, courts should consider a factor that
imposes a minimum time period on an interaction between a
defendant and victim—that is, set an amount of time that would
render an “opportunity to observe” presumptively reasonable.
Perhaps a total interaction time of one hour, as displayed in
Valas,282 is reasonable, however it still raises the issue of how
much time would constitute an unreasonable opportunity to
observe a victim. The ideal time period should afford ample time
to assess whether, despite any preconceived notions about
someone’s adult status, a person is actually an underage victim
of sex trafficking. If there were such a time limit, individuals
would have ample notice under the law to assess a potential
victim and those who unknowingly, unintentionally, and briefly
interact with sex trafficking victims would not face sex
trafficking criminalization.
The Eleventh Circuit held that a defendant had a
“reasonable opportunity to observe” a sex trafficking victim
when he spent twenty minutes photographing her for
Backpage.com advertisements.283 Twenty minutes was a
“considerable interaction” according to the court.284 Outside of
the context of sex trafficking, other courts have also determined
that twenty minutes was the minimum time requirement to
have a “reasonable opportunity to observe.” In Nettles v.
Wainwright,285 for example, the Fifth Circuit held that a victim
could reliably testify about a perpetrator’s identity because she
viewed him for “more than twenty minutes” and therefore had
a sufficient opportunity to observe him.286
281. See supra Part III.B (providing examples of inappropriate
applications of the statute).
282. See United States v. Valas, 822 F.3d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 2016)
(explaining that the victim came to Valas’s room for thirty minutes two days
in a row).
283. See United States v. Blake, 868 F.3d 960, 975–76 (11th Cir. 2017)
(stating that twenty minutes was a “considerable interaction,” and therefore
a “reasonable opportunity to observe”).
284. Id.
285. 677 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1982).
286. See id. at 414 (applying a minimum time limit to be able to render a
reliable identification of a perpetrator).
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The Supreme Court of Maine imposed the same time limit
on a witness’s reliable observation of a defendant’s sanity.287
The court stated that it “certainly know[s] of no jurisdiction in
which the opinion of a lay witness, as to the sanity of a man,
whom he has seen less than twenty minutes, would be regarded
as admissible.”288 The Arkansas Supreme Court quoted Maine’s
twenty-minute time limit when it held that a non-expert
witness’s less-than-five-minute observation of a defendant was
an unreasonable opportunity to observe her.289
Lastly, certain states require police officers to observe
suspected drunk drivers for a minimum of twenty minutes
before breathalyzing them.290 For instance, a Tennessee court
excluded the results of a breathalyzer test because “the
defendant had been observed for seventeen minutes rather than
the twenty minutes required by law.”291 Therefore, based on the
time limits implied by other courts in the § 1591(c) context as
well as those set in other areas of the law pertaining to
reasonable observation opportunities, courts evaluating
evidence under § 1591(c) should consider a factor of “at least a
twenty minute interaction” between a defendant and child sex
trafficking victim.
C. Over-Criminalization Due to Consideration of Relationships
and Knowledge of Human Trafficking
To better target the conduct that Congress intended to
criminalize,292 the interpretive factors should gauge whether

287. See State v. Turner, 138 A. 562, 563 (Me. 1927) (requiring that
witnesses have a sufficient opportunity to observe a defendant before
testifying about his sanity).
288. Id.; see also Henderson v. State, 94 S.W.2d 467, 468 (Tex. Crim. App.
1936) (permitting an expert witness to testify about the sanity of the defendant
after viewing him for “about twenty minutes” during trial).
289. See Spence v. State, 184 S.W.2d 986, 988 (Ark. 1931) (“They had no
reasonable opportunity to observe her acts and conduct except for a period of
time not exceeding five minutes . . . .”).
290. See State v. Ugrovics, 982 A.2d 1211, 1214 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2009) (noting that officers must observe suspected drunk drivers for the
prescribed twenty minutes before administering a breathalyzer test); State v.
Sensing, 843 S.W.2d 412, 416 (Tenn. 1992) (same).
291. Sensing, 843 S.W.2d at 416.
292. See TVPA of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 112, 114 Stat. 1464 (codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 1591) (criminalizing contemporary trafficking in persons).
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the defendant engaged in common forms of trafficking behavior
by focusing on a defendant’s abuse and coercion of a victim. As
discussed in Part III.B.2, broadly assessing the existence of a
“relationship” between the defendant and the victim would not
properly solve under- and over-criminalization issues due to the
typical recruiting tactics of pimps manipulating victims into
believing the two are in a relationship. Therefore, that factor
should be eliminated and the list instead should include “a
defendant’s use of force or coercion on a victim” and “a
defendant’s knowledge that a victim has a pimp or is otherwise
performing sexual services not of her or his own free will.”
Additionally, as founder of the Human Trafficking Institute
John Cotton Richmond recommended, a factor should be added
that targets “[a] defendant’s possession, review, or absence of [a]
victim’s identification documents”293 to further measure a
defendant’s use of coercion on a victim, and thus, his
“opportunity to observe” her. This factor would especially
protect undocumented persons. Undocumented victims often
fear that they will be deported if they report their traffickers to
law enforcement.294 Traffickers capitalize on victims’ fears and
immigration statuses by taking their passports and identifying
papers to restrict any ability to escape.295
Finally, under the current factor list, courts consider “prior
involvement with prostitutes or knowledge of signs of human
trafficking.”296 However, as explained, this has the potential to
criminalize those who merely attend a work-related training or
conduct academic research on human trafficking in the same

293. Richmond, supra note 36, at 310.
294. See Stephen P. Wood, The Intersection of Human Trafficking and
Immigration, HARV. L.: PETRIE FLOM (June 27, 2018), https://perma.cc/CC5F7MHT (last visited Mar. 28, 2020) (“The ever-looming threat of
deportation . . . can be a significant deterrent to victims reporting their
traffickers, making them even more reliant on them for perceived protection.
Many traffickers use the threat of deportation to control their victims, and the
widespread enforcement of immigration policy reinforces that fear.”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
295. See id. (“These are people who are often afraid, alone and frequently
have had their passports and other identifying papers taken from them by
their traffickers. They have no way to contact family or friends, as they are
stripped of their identity and have to rely on their traffickers for survival.”).
296. See supra Part II.B.
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manner as those who have a history of actively recruiting,
manipulating, and abusing trafficking victims.297 Because direct
interaction with victims should be distinguished from learning
about trafficking through work trainings,298 the factor should be
specified to “prior direct experience with human trafficking
victims.” This new factor specifies prior involvement with
human trafficking, not prostitution, to preserve Congress’s
intent to protect child sex trafficking victims under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1591.299 Though the human trafficking and adult prostitution
industries often overlap,300 the factor should specifically target
defendants with a history of human trafficking in order to
preserve Congress’s statutory intent.
D. A Revised Factor List
As this Note has demonstrated, the current interpretation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c) is problematic and can lead to
under-criminalization of child sex trafficking as well as
over-criminalization of non-trafficking behavior. In order to
better prevent courts from perpetuating these issues, this Note
recommends the following modified factor list that courts should
use to determine whether a defendant had a “reasonable
opportunity to observe” a victim. In assessing the evidence
regarding whether this standard is met, courts should consider
the following factors:
1. A defendant’s prior direct experiences with human
trafficking victims;
2. A defendant’s physical or virtual interaction with a
victim;
3. At least a twenty-minute interaction between a
defendant and victim;
297. See supra Part III.B (explaining how the broad interpretation of the
factor causes over-criminalization).
298. See supra Part III.B.3 (arguing that direct contact with victims
provides a more reasonable “opportunity to observe” a victim than other
indirect interactions).
299. See TVPA of 2000 § 102(a), (b) (enacting the statute to combat
contemporary forms of child sex trafficking).
300. See Bureau of Public Affairs, supra note 197 (explaining how
prostitution fuels human trafficking); see also Chuck Neubauer, Most Human
Trafficking Related to Prostitution, WASH. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2011), https://
perma.cc/P66S-3TXA (last visited Jan. 29, 2020) (stating that more than
eighty percent of suspected incidents of human trafficking involved forced
prostitution) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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4. A defendant’s use of force or coercion on a victim;
5. A defendant’s knowledge that a victim has a pimp
or is otherwise performing sexual services not of her
own free will;
6. A defendant’s possession, review, or absence of a
victim’s identification documents;
7. A victim’s youthful demeanor;
8. A victim’s disclosure of minor status;
9. A victim’s deceitfulness about her age;
10. A defendant’s knowledge of the background or
underage social network of a victim; and
11. A defendant’s participation in the recruitment or
advertisement of a victim’s services.

Using these factors will better ensure accuracy, protection,
and fairness in child sex trafficking cases. This standardized list
of factors based on many analyses of the current state of
modern-day human trafficking will aid courts in consistently
employing accurate interpretations of § 1591(c), as well as
provide stronger protection for victims and fairness for
defendants.
V. Conclusion
“The only way not to find this problem in any city is simply not
to look for it.”
–John F. Clark, President of the National Center for Missing
and Exploited Children301
When Congress passed the Victims of Trafficking and
Violence Protection Act of 2000, it stated:
One of the founding documents of the United States, the
Declaration of Independence, recognizes the inherent dignity
and worth of all people. It states that all men are created
equal and that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable rights. The right to be free from slavery
and involuntary servitude is among those unalienable
rights.302

301. Marianne Clyde, Not One More Victim, FAUQUIER TIMES (Aug. 11,
2018), https://perma.cc/6N2M-6G6G (last visited Mar. 28, 2020) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
302. TVPA of 2000 § 102(b)(22).
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It is the duty of courts to earnestly safeguard these
unalienable rights. Failing to properly interpret statutes in light
of changing technology and criminal industries allows victims
and defendants to fall through the cracks.
At age sixteen, Alyssa Beck escaped sexual slavery and was
present when a federal judge sentenced her trafficker to life in
prison.303 However, most victims are not as fortunate. Despite
recent improvements in awareness and law enforcement,304
there are still more than 10 million child trafficking victims
across the globe.305 Protecting children like Alyssa depends on
clarifying the interpretation of a “reasonable opportunity to
observe” a child sex trafficking victim under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c).
In recent years, courts have assessed whether a defendant had
a “reasonable opportunity to observe” a child sex trafficking
victim by focusing on his physical interaction with the victim,
his knowledge of human trafficking, his relationship with the
victim, and other factors.306 However, the current list of factors
that courts utilize creates a plethora of issues.307 It
under-criminalizes legitimate forms of modern sex trafficking,
such as webcam sex trafficking,308 and over-criminalizes
behavior outside the realm of sex trafficking.309 To resolve these
issues, courts should instead focus on factors that encompass
virtual interactions, coercive and violent relationships, and a
defendant’s prior direct experiences with human trafficking
victims.310
303. See Miller, supra note 1 (stating that Ian Sean Gordon received one
of the first life sentences for trafficking in the United States).
304. See Rebecca Sadwick, 7 Ways Technology Is Fighting Human
Trafficking, FORBES (Jan. 11, 2016), https://perma.cc/WB4G-8FCA (last
visited Jan. 29, 2020) (explaining various technological advancements that
allow law enforcement officers to combat new forms of human trafficking) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
305. See Forced Labour, Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking, supra
note 26 (noting that there are currently 40.3 million victims trapped in human
trafficking, twenty-five percent of whom are children).
306. See supra Part II.B (providing a full list of factors that courts use).
307. See supra Part III (explaining how the factor list under-criminalizes
sex trafficking acts and over-criminalizes other behavior).
308. See supra Part III.A (discussing the application of the statute to
webcam sex trafficking).
309. See supra Part III.B (explaining the consequences of problematic
factors).
310. See supra Part IV.D (providing a full list of recommended factors).
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The government is responsible for eradicating the rampant
spread of child sex trafficking. Courts can perform their role in
this global effort by applying an accurate and protective
interpretation of the child sex trafficking statute. As civil rights
leader Fannie Lou Hamer once said, “Nobody’s free until
everybody’s free.”311

311. See Terry Fitzpatrick, “Nobody’s Free Until Everybody’s Free”, FREE
SLAVES BLOG (Jan. 31, 2018), https://perma.cc/JNV4-Y3RZ (last visited
Jan. 29, 2020) (quoting Fannie Lou Hamer) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
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